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Abstract _ 
Can we make welfare comparisons of households of different characteristics on the 
basis of their observed behavior in relation to cornmodity demands? This paper reviews 
sorne of the fundamental difficulties encountered in the attempt to use the concept oí an 
equivalence scale as a vehic1e for introducing demographics and other characteristics into 
empirical demand analysis and, at the same time, for establishing interpersonal compar­
isons oí wel1-being. 
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lntroduction 
From the begining of the analysis of cross-section budget data, sorne practicioners have 
always been tempted by the possibility of establishing welfare comparisons of households 
of different characteristics on the basis of their observed behavior. 
Concentrating on demographic characteristics, households of different size and com­
position are said to have different "needs", which were supposed to be summarized by 
a set of numbers, one for each type of household, with the unit value usual1y given to a 
single male or a couple without children. Such an adult "equivalence scale", with which 
the budgets of different households could be converted to a needs-corrected basis, was 
supposed to be inferred, along other parameters of the demand system, from the observed 
consumption patterns of households of different demographic profiles. 
Qne could hardly exaggerate the practical and political importance of such compar­
isons for matters of public policy. AIso, in large parts of applied welfare economics we 
presuppose that individual utility levels have been adjusted for whatever differences in 
needs are relevant from an ethical point of view. Final1y, as Blackorby [1990] asserts, in 
so far as modern second-best theory indicates that policy recommendations cannot be 
distribution free "... our choice is between making interpersonal comparisons of utility or 
in having little or nothing to say". 
Given this pressure, it is rather conforting that early attempts to find an economic 
behavioral basis for welfare comparisons have becn placed into an appropiate conceptual 
framework by means of contemporary duality theory and the theory of the cost-of-living 
index.! However, this does not mean that all is well and settled in the foundations of this 
area. In particular, most economists would agree that the leap from behavior to welfare 
ought to be taken -if at all- with the greatest careo Thus, this Conference provides us 
with an opportunity to review the long list of objections that have been raised against 
the use of equivalence scales for normative purposes. 
The rest of this paper is organized in three sections. The first is devoted to the 
specification of the individual decision problem, and the distinction between conditional 
and unconditional preferences. The second section discusses sorne of the fundamental 
difficulties encountered in the attempt to use the concept of an equivalence scale as a 
vehicle for introducing demograppics and <:>ther characteristics into empirical demand 
analysis and, at the same time, for establishing interpersonal comparisons of well-being. 
The last section includes some concluding comments. 
1For a survey of the early work, which has its origins in Engel [1895], see Prais and Houthakker [1955], 
and Brown and Deaton [1972]. Building on the seminal work by Barten [1964], the modero treatment 
starts with Muellbauer [1974] and Gorman [1976]. For an excelent discussioD, which ineludes most of the 
points raised here, see Deaton and Muellbauer [1980], and the brief review by Deaton [1986]. 
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1 Notation, definitions and assunlptions 
Like the majority of the empirical papers in this area, let us concentrate for the moment 
on how households allocate current total expenditures among a number of consumption 
goods and services. 
Households are allowed to differ because two types of observable characteristics: those 
subject to choice, like the geographic location, the stock of durables, the household size, 
or the number and spacing of children; and those independent of households decisions, like 
each person's race or sex, or the age of adult household members. Thus, each household 
h in a typical sample of size H is identified by two vectors: a vector ah in a set A of 
characteristics of the first type, and a vector bh in a set B of characteristics of the second 
type. For each household, we also observe an n-dimensional vector of commodities, qh, 
hand a real number x h representing current total expenditure, such that x = p.qh , where 
p is an n-dimensional vector of prices. 
As far as household behavior is concerned, it is assumed that, subject to the cor­
responding budget constraint, each household maximizes a utility function Uh , which 
represents what is known in the literature as its conditional preferences for commodities; 
that is, its preferences given its observable charaeteristics of all sorts. 
In a classic paper, Pollak and Wales [1979] argued that such conditional preferences 
are not appropiate for welfare comparisons because they do not take into account the 
direct effect of household characteristics on utility. Thus, for instance, to compare the 
welfare of households with a different number of adults, economies of scale in consumption 
would have to be contrasted with a desire for privacy which may very well be a decreasing 
function of household size. Similarly, in a country like Spain, both the weather and 
nationalistic feelings are likely to infiuence the utility enjoyed from living in different 
autonomic regions. 
To formalize this position, it will be useful to assume that each household has solved 
an optimal problem, which need not be specified here, for the choice of a vector ah in 
A. Then, each household with characteristics (b\ ah) will be endowed with a set of 
unconditional preferences for cornmodities and characteristics subject to choice. These 
preferences will be assumed to be representable by a utility function 
u = Vh(q,a), 
which gives the unconditional utility that a household of characteristics bh which has 
chosen the vector ah would have when confronted with any pair consisting of a vector q 
in Rf. and a vector a in A. 
In this context, and regardless of whether ah = ah or not, it is natural to assume 
that conditional preferences for cornmodities result from the restriction of the uncondi­
tional utility function to the commodity space, given the observed vector of charaeteristics 
subjeet to choice, that is, 
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Vh = 1, ... ,H. 
o	 Thus, in general, conditional choices of cornmodities depend on the usual economic vari­
ables, prices and total expenditures, as wel1 as on the fol1owing vectors of characteristics: 
bh, ah and ah. 
On the other hand, if we now denote by Ch ( '11:, p, a) the unconditional cost function of 
the h-th household, we can extend the theory of the cost-of-living index for an individual 
e to cover the comparisons of different demographic (or other) profiles within the set A: an 
equivalence scale Dh(u,p, a) for a household h is defined by 
Dh( ) _	 Ch(u,p,a) 
u, p, a - Ch( 0) ,u,p,a 
e	 which gives the cost of attaining a utility level u at prices p by a household of character­
istics a, relative to the cost of attaining that utility level at those prices by a reference 
household of charaeteristics aO. 
It should be pointed out that, in the language of the theory, in this framework the term 
"household needs" is equivalent to "household unconditional preferences". Therefore, for 
each h in the population the equivalence scale Dh(u, p, a) provides the numbers wi th 
which one would defiate the distribution of total expenditures in order to adjust it to a 
needs-correeted basis, according to this household's unconditional preferences. 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
3 
C 
C 
e 
e 
C' 
( 
o 
2 Sorne difficulties in the use of equivalence scales 
for welfare econornics 
2.1 How many equivalence scales? 
As Pollak and Wales [1979] insist, as long as there are different unconditional preferences, 
true interpersonal comparisons of satisfaction of the type "strong desire for children, 
three children, $13.000 vs. weak desire for children, two children, $12.000", require a 
mapping specifying, for every utility level, which indifference set from each unconditional 
indifference map provides that given level of well-being. 
In the terminology of the latest contribution by Pollak [1990] to this debate, these are 
"welfare comparisons" about which he manifests himself "unwilling to dismiss them as 
a priori impossible or clearly meaningless". However, he reminds us very forcefully that 
"Finding mathematical correspondences between two indifference maps is easyj establish­
ing that a particular correspondence is a welfare correspondence is hard". As a matter of 
fact, we must conclude with him that "without a theory, any correspondence selected is 
arbitrary". And such a theory of interpersonal comparisons is still lacking. 
In view of this, and in order to continue the search for some behavioral foundation of a 
meaningful equivalence scale, we shall assume that, independently of the optimal choices 
ah, all households share a unique unconditional utility function; that is, 
u = Vh(q,a) = V(q,a), Vh = 1, ... ,H.2 
Consequently, we will have a single equivalence scale 
C(u,p, a)) _D(u, p, a - C( 0) ,u,p,a 
where C(u,p, a) is the unconditional cost function cornmon to all households. These 
numbers entail what Pollak [1990] would call "situational comparisons", always legitimate 
as long as we make them in terms of a single unconditional preference ordering. 
2.2 Does equal utilityimply equal welfare? 
Even if this model were to be empirically correct, Fisher [1987, 1990] claims that being on 
the same indifference curve is not a sufficient reason to assert that two households enjoy 
the same welfare. This is a normative decision which, in his opinion, we might not want 
to adopt because of either of the following reasons: 
2Notice that, in this formulation, either the characteristics not subject to choice do not matter at aH, 
or its infiuence can be easily incorporated within a single parametric representation, say: 
u = Vb(q, a), 'llb E B. 
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1. Even if two households have identical preferences, we may want to move beyond util­
ity considerations towards richer information environments, where relative moral worths 
(Fisher and Rothenberg [1961]) or re1ative "capahilities" or freedom to live decent lives 
(Sen [1984a, 1985]) are also taken into account. 
2. Fisher provides an example in which larger families enjoy the same utility level than 
smaHer ones in a situation in which, due to the substitution effects induced by children 
in Barten's model of cornmodity specific equivalence scales, these families face different 
prices for milk in terms of whisky. Then, rather than accepting the value judgement 
according to which we ought to treat symmetrical1y the ability of larger families to buy 
milk and of smal1er ones to afford whisky, Fisher suggests that we might find ethical1y 
indispensable to examine also the consumption vectors of both types of households. 
3. Final1y, tastes differences associated to certain attributes might not be ethically 
neutral, however wel1 are captured in a given empirical model. As Fisher points out, 
systematic differences between the preferences of blacks and whites may partly refiect 
past income or past social status. Think also of the possiblity of sex discrimination in 
the treatment of male and female children within the household, as documented in Sen 
[1984b]. What should we conclude from a normative point of view if, as a result, it costs 
more to maintain a certain utility level in households with expensive tastes or a prevalence 
of children of a given gender? 
Perhaps we don't know yet how to treat differences in capabilities and other fundamen­
tal rights, and we stilllack clear criteria on the ethical desirability of different cornmodity 
bundles. But if morally objeetionable private tastes happen to explain people's choices, 
surely it would be unwise to use them uncriticaHy in situational comparisons. 
2.3 How likely is the empiricaI modeI? 
For those who want to pursue the study of the empirical literature in spite of Fisher's 
objeetions, it is worth while to recal1 that the road from the evidence on conditional choices 
to the estimation of sorne common unconditional preferences starts from the assumption 
that, for each h, qhsolves the problem of maximizing V(q, ah) subjeet to the corresponding 
budget constraint. 
For this process to have any hope of success, we must impose further restrictions on 
conditional preferences. To begin with, for the application of the theory of the cost-of­
living index it is necessary that, at any utility level, the indifference curves of any pair of 
different households do not intersect -a requirement thatis never made explicito 
As far as the empirical implementation of the model, one starts by seleeting a com­
plete, theoretical1y plausible demand system, say q = q(p, x). Then, the most general 
assumption is that households of different charaeteristics will have different demand sys­
tems because the conditional utility functions V(q, ah) = Uh(q) are aH distinct -a fact 
that can only be tested with panel data, and that will be of little help in the recovery 
of unconditional preferences. At the opposite extreme, one may test the hypothesis that 
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household characteristics do not matter at aH, i.e., that V(q, ah) = U(q) for aH h, in which 
case the preferences' recovery will be also impossible. 
Somewhere in between, is the possibility that household characteristics infiuence al1 
the parameters of the demand system, but in a different manner for each of the subsets 
of a partition of the sample; that is, given a partition in terms of one or more observable 
characteristics into Tr different types, r = 1, ... ,R, 
Vh E Tr 
Unfortunately, this situation is undistinguishable from the existence of types at the un­
conditional level, i.e., 
in which case we would be back in the untractable "welfare comparisons" problem. Thus, 
the only possibility compatible with our purpose is that the differences in conditional 
tastes could be conveniently parametrized within the confines of a single utility function 
for the whole sample, indexed by the vector of observable characteristics. 
To surnmarize, the fol1owing are the a priori conditions under which it makes sense 
the attempt to base the situation comparisons embodied in a single equivalence scale on 
the observed commodity choices of a sample of households with different characteristics: 
(1) Vh(q,a) = V(q,a) Vh = 1, ... ,H; 
(2) Vu,Vah,ah' E A, {q E R~: V(q, ah) = u} n {q E R~: V(q, ah') = u} = 0; 
(3) V(q, ah) = Uah(q) Vh = 1, ... , H. 
A natural question to ask is how likely are these conditions in practice? Three types of 
remarks are in order. 
1. In the first place, as PoHak and Wales [1979] point out, it is difficult to believe 
that the distribution of unconditional preferences is independent of the distribution of 
household characteristics, particularly those which are subject to choice. Think, for ex­
ample, of the direct preferences for children of chlildless bachelors or couples of a variety 
of sexual persuasions, relative to households which conciously decided to have them in 
large numbers. 
2. So far we have restricted ourselves to the aUocation of current expenditures, but it 
should be clear that the framework can be adapted to deal with intertemporal consider­
ations or the interactions of demographics, time use and work effort.3 
For example, in Pashardes [1989], parents may provide for the cost of raising children 
part1y by reducing their current expenditures and partly by drawing on their savings, 
including the depletion of the stocks of durables, or their capacity to borrow. This leads 
to equivalent income -rather than expenditures- scales, which may be infiuenced by the 
3See the discussion of these extensions in Deaton and Muellbauer [1980]. Browning [1990] reviews the 
impact of children on a variety of economic decisions. 
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differences in the availability of credit across household types. On the other hand, it 
suffices to mention the work of Browning and Meghir [1991] for the likely size of the bias 
on the estimated effect of children from ignoring labor supply considerations. 
It can be argued that sorne government programs may be intended to maintain a min­
imum short-run, narrowly defined, concept of welfare for all households. Nevertheless, for 
other purposes in welfare economics, the broader the commodity space and the behavior 
that is modeled to produce estimates of equivalence scales, the more appropiate from a 
normative point of view. 
3. Within the ordinalist tradition, there is a long resistance to accept that individuals 
can be reduced to a list of characteristics. On the other hand, there is sorne moral worth 
in the position that the only individuaL features one ought to take into account in our 
concept of economic welfare are those observable, objeetive charaeteristics which may 
infiuence people's behavior. Be it as it may, there is little doubt about the desirability of 
enlarging as much as possible the vector of household charaeteristics. 
In relation to points 2 and 3, it might be the case that the broader the behavior 
considered and/or the richer the characteristics' space, the most likely that household 
heterogeneity will carry the day versus the hypothesis that differences in tastes can be 
allowed for by the indexing of a single utility funetion. The use of large sets of microdata, 
which will liberate empirical work from the restrictions imposed by exaet agreggation 
considerations and parametric methods, might also point in this direction4 • 
2.4 Can we ever recover unconclitional preferences? 
Even if the above necessary conditions were empirically satisfied, Pollak and Wales [1979] 
were again the first to call the attention to a difficulty of a more fundamental nature. The 
problem is simply that, given V(q, a), for any funetion F monotonic in its first argument, 
F[V(q, a), a] = W(q,a) 
represents different unconditional preferences for cornmodities and charaeteristics, leading 
to a different cost funetion and equivalence scale, but gives rise to the same system of 
Marshalian demand funetions. Consequently, as they put it: "Observed differences in the 
consumption patterns of two- and three-child families cannot even tell us whether the 
third child is a blessing or a curse." 
More precisely, Blundell and Lewbel [1990] have shown that given any observed de­
mand system, one can find a unique cost function that rationalizes the conditional choices 
and yields any possible values for equivalence scales in any one given price regime pO. How­
ever, the uniqueness of such cost function implies that, if the true values of the equivalence 
4Browning [1990] reports significant variation in the correlation between women's labor supply and 
children across race, age, marital status and education. Gozalo [1990], in one of the first applications of 
non-parametric techniques to the estimation of a system of Engel curves, finds evidence of heterogeneity 
by household types, a fact also established with the benefit ofmicrodata in Barnes and Gillingham [1984]. 
See also the results of Pollak and Wales [1980, 1981], Muellbauer [1977], and Nelson [1988]. 
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scale in one price regime is known, then observable demands can be used to recover the 
values of the true equivalence scale in all other price regimes. 
To illustrate the force of this result, consider the following decomposition for any 
equivalence scale: 
D(u,p, a) C(u,p,a) C(u, p, aO) -
C(u,p,a)/C(u,pO,a) 
C(u, p, (L°)/C( u, pO, aO) 
C(u,pO, a) 
C(u,po,ao) 
L(p,pO,u,a) C(u,pO,a) 
L(p, pO, u, aO) C(u, pO, aO)' 
where L(p, pO, u, .) is a cost-of-living index comparing prices p and po at the utility level u 
for the corresponding household. The result says that only the ratio of household specific 
cost-of-living indices -that is, the relative equivalence scale- can be identified with demand 
data alone; however, nothing can be said in the base price regime pO. 
Then, what is to be done in the usual case with time series data on conditional choices, 
prices, and household characteristics? According to Blundell and Lewbel there are three 
alternatives: 
i) Collect additional data to overcome the identification problem. Data on revealed 
preference for household characteristics subjeet to choice, on subjective opinions in the 
manner of Van Praag and his associates5 , or on poverty lines for households of different 
profiles. 
ii) Report solely those results which are independent of the choice of F, i.e., the ratio 
of household specific cost-of-living indices, which inform us solely on the way equivalence 
scales change over time in response to price changes. 
iii) Given any U consistent with the demand system, identify an equivalence scale 
by the cardinalization of utility which results from the selection of an arbitrary choice 
of F by means of untestable, but hopefully reasonable and explicit, assumptions. This 
last route is the one taken by most empirical research. Notice, however, that sorne of 
these models place also testable restrictions on conditional choices, as well as explicit 
limitations on the allowable interhousehold comparisons of utility.6 Nevertheless, given 
the arbitrariness of the cardinalization of preferences implied by any of these procedures, 
the testing of the empirical implications provides a necessary but not a sufficient condition 
for its acceptance.7 In this context, sufficiency must depend on other criteria like a priori 
5See the references quoted in Blunde11 and Lewbel [1990] and Hagenaars [1986] 
6See , for example, the restrictions implied in the important case in which equivalence scales are 
a110wed to vary with prices and household composition but are independent of the utility level, i.e., 
the ESE (Equivalent Scale Exactness) property of Blackorby and Donaldson [1989a, 1989b], ca11ed IB 
(Independent of Base utility) by Lewbel [1989a, 1989b]. This last author explores also the conditions 
under which IB is consistent with Barten type commodity specific scales, as we11 as the conection between 
lB and exact aggregation conditions used, for example, by Jorgenson and Slesnick [1983, 1987] in the 
translog context, or by Ray [1982, 1983, 1986] and Rossi [1988] in the Almost Ideal Demand System. 
Notice, however, that if equivalence scales are independent of prices -like in so many contributions to this 
volume which estimate Engel scales- nothing at a11 ca.n be learned about the true equivalence scale from 
observed conditional demands. 
7Por sorne recent examples of the testing of the lB property, see Blunde11, Pashardes, and Weber [1989] 
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reasonableness of the model, empirical convenience in applications, or ex post plausibility 
of the results obtained. 
2.5 Whose welfare? 
All of the aboye did not take into account that although the majority of households consist 
of more than one person, microeconomic data at the greatest level of disaggregation refers 
only to the total household consumption of each commodity without direct information 
on the allocation of these totals among household members. 
To rationalize such observable choices, it suffices to assume the existenceof household 
preferences without questioning its origino But whose preferences are these in multiper­
son arrangements? This is important in normative analysis because, ultimately, we are 
interested in individual rather than household welfare. 
A simple way out consists of assuming, like Blackorby and Donaldson [1989a, 1989b], 
that each household member enjoys the same level of well-being, on the grounds that the 
household social welfare function maximizes the utility of the worse-off individual. Then, 
of course, there is no difficulty in allowing every individual in the population, including 
children, to count in social evaluations. However, the cost of this procedure, like these 
authors themselves admit, is that sorne ethically significant intrahousehold inequality is 
missed. 
In other interpretations, the household utility function represents parental welfare.8 If 
by this we mean the utility parents derive from the commodities they themselves consume, 
then Gronau [1988, 1989] has argued very forcefully that a prerequisite for any compari­
son of consumption patterns between families of different p~ofiles is the assumption that 
parents' welíare is independent of the existence of children and the composition of their 
consumption. Otherwise, one could not tell whether a decline in parental consumption of 
a cornmodity is caused by a diversion of resources from parents to children or by the fact 
that parents "lose the taste" for the good once they have children. 
Gronau himself recognizes that the separability of parents' and children' consumption 
is not a natural assumption in the context of the family. Fortunately, whether the inter­
actions between the two groups are important or not is an empirical question that can be 
put to test.9 Setting aside the difficulties oí: isolating parental welfare with the available 
data, what we want to remark is the shift of attention toward the modeling of the effect 
on welfare of the intrafamily allocation of resources. 
Of course, the inquiry into the nature of the household utility function need not 
stop here: the parental decision unit may very well admit a further breakdown into its 
constituent parts in the interest of both positive and normative economics10 • 
in the PIGLOG context, or Phipps [1990] and Nicol [1990] in the translog one. 
8See , ror instance, Pollal< and Wales [1979] and Deaton and Muellbauer [1980, 1986]. 
9See , ror instance, Deaton, Ruiz-Castillo and Thomas [1989] or Gronau [1989]. 
lOFor an interesting cornrnentary on different theoretical approaches to what goes on inside the house­
hold "black box" , see Pollak [1985]. See also Bourguignon [1989] and the contribution of Chiappori [1990] 
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3 Conclusions 
o	 1. The search for an empirical basis to establish interpersonal comparisons among house­
holds has proved to be ful1 of obstacles. Even if we restrict ourselves to situational com­
parisons, any attempt at the estimation of the common unconditional preference ordering 
from conditional cornmodity choices will always encounter a fundamental identification 
problem. 
o	 If one insists in selecting an arbitrary cardinalization, and carry on with the empirical 
excercise, at the very least one should make sure that the data supports the maintenance of 
the necessary conditions on the homogeneity of preferences and other testable restrietions 
often imposed by the cardinalization assumption. 
2. Perhaps, the most productive efforts in this area in the near future will come from 
o the empirical and theoretical research about what goes on inside of the household. As 
Pol1ak [1990], once more, makes clear "Abandoning the notion of household or family 
preferences exposes two distinct issues: the treatment of confiicting preferences of adults 
within the household, and the treatment of children's interests, needs, wants, and desires." 
3. In the meanwhile, if the data indicates that there are different household types, this o 
need not be the end of al1 welfare aggregation exereises. One could apply, for instance, 
the more general but less demanding approach suggested by Atkinson and Bourguignon 
[1987], Bourguignon [1989] and Atkinson [1987], which investigates the conditions on 
household utility funetions, defined on income and household size, for establishing the 
social welfare dominance of one distribution of income over another. 
o 
Also, one could pursue the proposals contained in the contribution to this volume by 
Coulter, Cowel1, and Jenkins [1990], trying to improve the distributional assesments by 
introducing robust methods which take into account a diversity of potential equivalence 
scales. 
o	 4. Final1y, for many purposes, one may simply report the impact of, say, a certain 
policy on each of the household types, without insisting in solving the aggregation problem 
for the user of the analysis. 
to this volume. For a recent empirical study, see Lazear and Michael [1988]. 
o 
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